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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Adolph Heusinger,
7 April 1957

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. General Heusinger spent Sunday, 7 April, at my home relaxing after a strenuous two week visit to key defense installations in the United States as a guest, along with other military leaders of the NATO nations, of Admiral Radford. He departed for Bonn by plane 8 April.
3. Heusinger expects he will get his fourth star and be named either "Inspector General of the Armed Forces" or "Chief of the Armed Forces" within the next few weeks. As such he will in fact be both the Chief of Staff and Commanding General of the German Armed Forces. The former function goes with the position; the latter has been delegated as a function to him by the Defense Minister.
4. Heusinger thinks Strauss is doing a good job as Defense Minister. His energy, his political acumen, his rapport with the press and his association with his fellow Bavarian CSU Finance Minister Fritz Schaefer immediately give him advantages which his predecessor, Theodore Blank, lacked. Heusinger, Speidel and other senior officers shared initial and, as it now appears, unnecessary apprehensions with Adenauer that the youthful Defense Minister might in fact move too quickly and too drastically in a reorganization and reorientation of the Ministry. Heusinger was fully aware of the initial "Heusinger-must-go" influences on Strauss. He met this head-on by going to Strauss offering to step aside if Strauss wished him to do so. Strauss declined and it now appears that Heusinger is solidly established as Germany's first soldier—which is precisely what he told me to expect eight years ago when we first discussed this subject.
5. Internally, Germany is doing better with her new Army than Heusinger had anticipated. The existence of German troops has brought both public and official attention to military matters down to a

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practical level. Public opinion is vastly improved; the attitude of the individual draftee is commendable.

6. Heusinger considers the British military policy a disaster for Europe. He regards it as a long-shot gamble by the British to retain status as a World Nuclear Power at the expense of European solidarity. He anticipates that the British action will produce in Europe a political avalanche that will seriously undermine NATO and render SHAPE incapable of developing a land force strong enough to act as a serious deterrent for the Soviet forces in a position to attack Northwest Europe. This consideration, he said, had produced an obvious depressing effect on the relationship of the senior British officers with those of other NATO countries during the entire visit in the U.S.

7. Heusinger's attraction to and dependence upon the United States seemed to me to be stronger than ever. I have the impression that he considers General Hodas, the present CG of USAREUR, to be the best commander of ground forces in Europe. In terms of strategic thinking, the concepts for defending Europe worked out by General Gruenther are today, he says, just as sound as they were four years ago.

8. The extent to which German forces should be armed with atomic weapons is, according to Heusinger, a significant political and military issue in Germany today. There is, he says, a tremendous need for clarification of the thinking of both politicians and soldiers on the technical characteristics and limitations of small tactical atomic weapons. In this connection, Heusinger said that Admiral Radford had asked Heusinger to explain the manner by which the Chancellor is advised with regard to public statements on matters of military policy. Heusinger told Admiral Radford that many of these statements are completely spontaneous and very often as much a surprise to the Defense Ministry as to the rest of the world.

9. The lack of intelligence on Soviet tactical atomic weapons, rockets and missiles geographically situated to support the Soviet Forces in the GDR in an attack to the West is a matter of considerable concern to Heusinger and will be the priority requirement imposed on Gehlen by the Defense Ministry in the near future. Heusinger would be most interested in U.S. information on this subject. I told him that my immediate reaction would be to say that we have no information that indicates the presence of such weapons either in the GDR or in Poland.